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Introduction to Symposium on Toward a 
Feminist Theory of the State 
Catharine A. MacKinnon† 
 
The day after the presidential election of 2016, many more 
Americans than ever had before woke up to the world my work has 
inhabited for the past 40-some years—Toward a Feminist Theory 
of the State1 having largely been written in the early 1970s.  It is 
the world in which sexual harassment, including rape, is normal 
and normalized by power, and men are the boys in the “boys will 
be boys” dismissing it.  Here, the more power a man has, the more 
sexual abuse he can get away with.  Women, regardless of 
qualifications, are not taken seriously, our policy ideas simply not 
heard; serious women (the un-fun kind2) become “nasty” when we 
call male power out.  In this world, the more competent and 
accomplished a woman is, the more she can be resented and hated.  
“I don’t like her” becomes an accepted reason not to vote for her; I 
never heard “I don’t like him” as a reason not to vote for him.  As if 
she ran for most popular. 
Women in the millions do not value themselves in this world, 
not enough to think that misogyny matters enough to affect their 
actions, including their votes, even when the flagrant anti-woman 
attitudes admittedly bothered them, and they could oppose it in 
secret.  During this election cycle, misogyny suddenly became a 
word people learned to use—newly dubbed “internalized 
misogyny” so women can have it too although it is not new that 
women have internalized it—as in women saying “yeah, it 
bothered me, but it’s just personal,” the personal as political memo 
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 †. The participants in this Symposium have my heartfelt gratitude, 
admiration, and respect for engaging my work with such brilliance and courage.  
These introductory remarks are dedicated to Bob Stein, who as dean of the 
University of Minnesota Law School gave me a listen and—crucial to my survival—
a job, at a time when no one else would or did.  The speech I gave in 1980, “To 
Change the World for Women,” which initiated our connection, is published for the 
first time at CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, BUTTERFLY POLITICS 11 (2017). 
 1. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
(1989). 
 2. See ANDREA DWORKIN, ICE & FIRE: A NOVEL 90 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
1st Am. ed. 1987) (1986) (placing “I’m a feminist, not the fun kind,” in mouth of 
character in novel). 
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apparently not having been received.  In this world, even when a 
woman gets the most votes, she doesn’t win the election because of 
a system that women had no voice in designing.  As with the 
Violence Against Women Act,3 she was defeated by a stacked 
feature of federalism, an organization of “states” men designed to 
keep their distribution of power among themselves in a certain 
balance. 
The 2016 presidential election further confirmed the view 
underlying the quotation of and reference to work by women of 
color in Toward a Feminist Theory of the State that they are 
exemplary of women.  Instead of abstracting away attributes 
regarded as other-than-sex from women’s social existence, Toward 
began methodologically with all women’s social particulars, 
including race, without purporting to have fully developed the 
place of race in gender (or in class) before its full theoretical 
development had been further undertaken by its leading 
practitioners.4  Contrary to the phony citations and essentialism 
 
 3. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil 
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act as exceeding congressional 
authority under the Constitution). 
 4. For discussion and citations bringing thinking on the question relatively up 
to date, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Intersectionality as Method: A Note, 38 SIGNS 
1019 (2013). 
  Although it is far from the most urgent question we face, and not precisely 
a question of intersectionality, racism on one level remains largely unexplained not 
only here but anywhere.  Sexuality as a social construct is argued to be the 
animating dynamic in gender hierarchy in Toward: what gender hierarchy is 
about.  What is racism about?  It could be about power in all its forms, but so is 
gender, without thereby explaining it.  Certainly, the consequences of racism are 
enough to bring about its end, and it can be attacked through descriptions of it of 
which there is no lack.  But that is also the case with gender, without satisfying the 
explanatory question.  Can something be ended without knowing what it is really 
about?  It seems that people imagine there has to be something valid and essential 
under women’s second class status, and that it cannot be ended without knowing 
what it is driven by.  Could it be that people in general have gotten to the point, 
this election notwithstanding, where they do not think that about race anymore?  
Whatever the reason, there is a lack of urgency in explaining racial hierarchy: 
white supremacy, mainly.  Maybe not having to ask what white supremacy is 
centrally about, what centrally drives it, means having gotten past the need to 
justify the humanity of the groups it subordinates, a point to which women as such 
have yet to arrive.  Maybe nothing is learned from the lack of parallelism.  But 
despite some explanatory attempts, people are not breaking their heads over this 
question regarding race as they have, and are, over gender.  Race is extensively 
investigated without answering this question.  Perhaps I am looking in the wrong 
places, but see, e.g., JOHN SOLOMOS & KARIM MURJI, THEORIES OF RACE AND 
ETHNICITY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES AND PERSPECTIVES (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2014).  For quick overviews from various disciplines, surprisingly useful as entry 
points are the essays and bibliographies in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d ed., Amsterdam 2015) (see essays by authors 
Moses (“Race and Racism in the Twenty-First Century”); Fredrickson 
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lie of some critics,5 Toward practiced an incipient intersectionality.  
It realized that women of color are the hardest to fool.  The 2016 
presidential election confirmed that it apparently takes White 
women four years of college to even begin to learn what women of 
color, regardless of educational level, already know.6  The election 
also confirmed the simple point (seemingly it needed confirmation) 
that sexism has not been solved. 
All this apparently being more out in the open than ever, now 
is as good a time as any, and better than some, to reflect on how 
class, and class consciousness or lack of it, shapes gender, and 
gender consciousness or lack of it: a relation between sex and 
class.  In the present moment, White working class men (“White” 
having become maybe even a little bit marked?) who resent their 
economic situation brought their racial and gendered resentments 
with them, blaming the wrong people for their class position.  In 
reality, they were resenting the effects of capitalism working as it 
is designed to work, such that someone—they in this case—will be 
in the situation they are in and resent being in.  Their lack of class 
consciousness of this fact, with their gendered and raced attitudes, 
produced identification with the aggressor.  In this light, it is no 
surprise that White working class women, who have never been 
middle class and are likely never to be—making middle class the 
latest euphemism for working class will not achieve this—do not 
identify with or as women, but with the men of the class they are 
with.  As pointed out in Toward, women’s class status is vicarious, 
 
(“Introduction to Racism”; “History of Racism”); Clair & Denis (“Sociology of 
Racism”); Augoustinos & Every (“Racism: Social Psychological Perspectives”); and 
Hervik (“Xenophobia and Nativism”)); THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 
(Michael T. Gibbons ed., Wiley-Blackwell 2014) (see essay by Alexander-Floyd); 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1417–20 (George Thomas Kurian ed., CQ 
Press 2011).  See also LES BLACK & JOHN SOLOMOS, THEORIES OF RACE AND 
RACISM: A READER (Taylor & Francis 2002).  Illuminating on historical dynamics is 
GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY (Princeton Univ. Press 2002). 
 5. I respond to these criticisms in general (not confined to Toward) in 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Keeping it Real: On Anti-“Essentialism”, in CROSSROADS, 
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 71–83 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome 
Culp & Angela Harris eds., 2002). 
 6. Data sets on the votes of these demographic groups from sources such as 
the Federal Election Commission and the Pew Research Center are not yet publicly 
available.  Most major news outlets used the same exit polling data from Edison 
Research, which found that 43% of White women voted for Hillary Clinton, 52% for 
Donald Trump.  White women with college degrees voted 51% for Hillary, 44% for 
Trump; White women without college degrees voted 34% for Hillary, 61% for 
Trump.  Latinas voted 69% for Hillary, 25% for Trump.  Black women voted 94% 
for Hillary, 4% for Trump.  See Exit Polls, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/election/
results/exit-polls/national/president (last visited May 9, 2017) and 2016 National 
President Exit Poll, FOX NEWS, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/elections/2016/exit-
polls (last visited May 9, 2017) to view and sort the data. 
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which does not mean it is not real.  Compare the class status of 
Melania Trump now with her likely class status had she not 
married him.  Class partly shapes gender for both women and 
men, including consciousness, and lack of consciousness, of it. 
In this context, Katharine Bartlett rightly asked for a full 
theory of income inequality: how a system of economic 
subordination creates and maintains itself.7  As she largely 
recognized, Marx has substantially already provided it.  
Combining my approach with his—as Toward began to do, the 
basics of which Max Waltman’s Article explains clearly and 
accessibly, lucidly connecting Toward’s epistemological analysis 
with its critique of the state and its specific laws,8 which 
Katharine Bartlett also recapitulates with focus on the class 
context9—the legal theory of substantive equality (as absent for 
race as for sex) addresses race and/or sex-based income inequality.  
Under it, the legal claim for comparable worth would be 
recognized, the lack of which is largely responsible for much 
income inequality, given that formal equality theory considers 
structurally unequal work (resulting in less income) to be a 
“difference” that permits treating it “differently.”10  Once 
structural sex- and race-based income inequality is addressed, the 
question becomes: how much of class-based income inequality is 
left?  Some, surely; but for some reason the question has not been 
asked in this way.  White men’s income inequality is real, but it is 
the least of the income inequality problem. 
Many more cross-cutting themes and observations connect 
these Articles, and are connected in these Articles—each a 
contribution to scholarship in itself—with Toward a Feminist 
Theory of the State and the ongoing realities we are experiencing.  
The sexualized animus that animates male dominance from the 
intimate to the institutional to the structural, analyzed as central 
to sex inequality in Toward, might also be termed misogyny.  Its 
implementation is tellingly exposed in Joan Meier and Sean 
 
 7. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Economic Inequality, 35 LAW & INEQ. 
265, 276 (2017). 
 8. Max Waltman, Appraising the Impact of Toward a Feminist Theory of the 
State: Consciousness-Raising, Hierarchy Theory, and Substantive Equality Laws, 
35 LAW & INEQ. 353 (2017) 
 9. Bartlett, supra note 7, at 280–84. 
 10. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 247, 253–70 (Foundation 
Press, 3d ed. 2016), and Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Renewed Equal Rights 
Amendment: Now More Than Ever, first published at 37 HARVARD J. GENDER & 
LAW 569 (2014), collected in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, BUTTERFLY POLITICS 299–
301 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2017) (discussing comparable worth). 
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Dickson’s Article, confirming what has long been observed with 
anguish by mothers of sexually abused children, their lawyers, 
and support communities. 11  Accusing a father of sexually abusing 
his children often precipitates the granting of legal custody to him, 
the mother being deemed the “unfriendly parent” because she 
accused him.  Knowledge of this regularity has been mainly 
experiential.  The Meier and Dickson research shows preliminarily 
that, perversely, fathers accused of sexually abusing their children 
are more likely to be given custody of them than fathers not so 
accused.12  It also shows that battering, which often includes rape, 
and can produce pregnancy, is still not a barrier to men’s access to 
children.13  Both of these situations scream out for a substantive 
sex equality approach in family law that grasps the place of state-
supported sexual abuse.  These realities regrettably support the 
critique in Toward that sexual abuse by men is a state-protected 
activity. 
At the risk of repetition, since such sexual abuse is a major 
part of the substance of substantive equality, it seems worth 
clarifying the distinction between formal and substantive equality 
one more time.  Sexism principally envisions a symmetrical 
system enforced by stereotypes in which the sexes are equally 
stereotyped.  It is true that men as well as women are equally, 
even viciously, stereotyped, but that does not make the stereotypes 
equal.  Male dominance and female subordination, masculinity 
over femininity, is not a symmetrical system.  It is a hierarchical 
one, as explained with admirable lucidity and comprehensiveness 
by Max Waltman14 and brilliantly extended by Shannon 
Gilreath.15  Gender hierarchy defines the unequal, even lethal, 
content of the stereotypes as well as many other modes of 
enforcement that interact with them, such as physical force and 
money.  Formal equality addresses sexism, or, as Katharine 
Bartlett clarifies, its illusions.16 
Now look at the substantive sex inequalities underneath the 
formal sex inequalities the law recognizes as sex discriminatory.  
The substantive inequality underlying the statute in Reed v. 
 
 11. Joan S. Meier & Sean Dickson, Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light 
on Family Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse and Alienation, 35 LAW & 
INEQ. 311 (2017). 
 12. Id. at 326–30. 
 13. Id. at 327–28. 
 14. Waltman, supra note 8, at 359–63. 
 15. See Shannon Gilreath, A Feminist Agenda for Gay Men (Or: Catharine 
MacKinnon and the Invention of a Sex-Based Hope), 35 LAW & INEQ. 289 (2017). 
 16. Bartlett, supra note 7. 
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Reed17 was women’s exclusion from the business world.  In Craig 
v. Boren,18 recognizing middle tier scrutiny where we are all 
moored, it was boys’ cowboy drinking with dangerous driving.  In 
Frontiero v. Richardson,19 where women got the holy grail of strict 
scrutiny for a few plurality moments (the fact it is race 
discrimination’s standard shows just how unholy it actually is), it 
was women’s economic dependency on men.  But notice, these 
underlying substantive sex inequalities were the reasons the 
authorities gave for their sex-based distinctions; they were the 
defense against recognizing that these laws discriminate based on 
sex.  Those who argued that the laws were sex-discriminatory said 
women are not so illiterate and innumerate anymore even if they 
were before, boys do not in such huge proportions drink to excess 
and drive dangerously even though they do so far more than girls, 
and women are less dependent on men economically than they 
used to be.  In other words, it was only by denying realities of the 
substantive inequality that is gender—women’s continued 
disproportionate exclusion from the business world (and 
constituting the majority of the world’s illiterate population), 
men’s greater tendency to do the driving as well as to drink to 
excess and drive, and the economy’s continued discrimination 
against women’s economic self-sufficiency—or by pointing out that 
women had already partially overcome these problems all by 
themselves with no help from the law, that these facially sex-
based statutes were struck down as sex discriminatory.  The 
question is not what this approach did in these cases, but what it 
will do when faced with the underlying realities—some of the real 
terrain of sex inequality—that had to be denied to win them.  
Formal equality deals with sex-based illusions just fine.  What 
about its realities? 
What this means is that the more the underlying substantive 
inequality is real and persists in damaging women, the less the 
formal equality approach is designed to be able to stop it: you can’t 
get there from here.  Which is why we haven’t.  When courts find 
gender hierarchy, they think they have found the sex difference, so 
in treating unlikes unalike, discrimination is justified.  Reflecting 
difference in law is equality, not inequality.  This is highlighted 
most in the question of affirmative action, which is easier to justify 
for sex than for race because doctrinally race is a discriminatory 
illusion, not a discriminatory reality, so solving racism means race 
 
 17. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 18. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 19. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
2017] INTRODUCTION TO SYMPOSIUM  261 
cannot be taken into account.  The more clear the law is that 
something needs to be done about a real problem, the more 
difficult it becomes to justify doing anything about it under the 
formal equality approach.  Recognizing the unequal reality of sex 
inequality, as the substantive equality does, has precisely the 
opposite result that the formal equality approach has to that same 
reality. 
Once gender is grasped as a social hierarchy, not a sameness 
or a difference, it becomes obvious why substantive sex equality 
analysis has promoted gay rights20 as Shannon Gilreath shows, 
and transgender rights21 as sex equality rights, even if the 
substantive foundation is not expressly legally recognized.22  
Shannon Gilreath illustrates here, offering an inspiring 
unvarnished look at the realities of male power, uncompromised 
and incisive insights into the lethality of male dominant 
sexuality—so pure and exposed in the male-on-male context—with 
an intimate look at male desire free of the usual exoneration, 
converging on a cogent critique of much queer theory.23 
These authors pursue, gyroscopically, the same sense of 
direction as substantive equality theory: the real issue of 
inequality is superiority and inferiority, valued over less valuable, 
richer and justifiably poorer, powerful over rightly powerless.  The 
understanding accordingly that pervades these Articles that 
equality is not a morality, highlighted by Professor Bartlett,24 may 
be the hardest point to get across in a liberal environment.25  The 
Articles in this Symposium valuably treat sex inequality not as an 
issue of good and bad, but of power and harm.  When substantive 
inequality is recognized as hierarchy of superior over inferior, sex 
equality is revealed not as a value but as a fact denied realization 
in social orderings and law, because women as a group are not, in 
fact, men’s human inferiors.  These Articles proceed on the 
assumption that once sex equality is a legal guarantee, the moral 
 
 20. See Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 15, 2015); Hively 
v. Ivy Tech Community College, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citing 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore, Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) and Baldwin v. Foxx). 
 21. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding 
that the revocation of a job offer from a transgender women violated Title VII’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination). 
 22. Former students have produced legal results that I have urged for forty 
years. 
 23. Gilreath, supra note 15, at 295–307. 
 24. Bartlett, supra note 7, at 272–73. 
 25. Many call such environments “neoliberal.” I mean classically liberal and 
have yet to see anything “neo” about those so labeled. 
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discussion over whether it is a positive value, a nice idea, a good 
thing to do, is over.  The remaining question is whether a given 
practice (say, one challenged in a case) is an integral part of 
substantive inequality.  With the issues faced in this 
Symposium—rape, pornography, homophobia, prostitution, sexual 
abuse of children, battering, income inequality—this question is 
not difficult. 
On rape, the existing system is better at incarcerating people 
who did not sexually assault someone than those who did.  This is 
in substantial part because it does not focus the definition of the 
crime on the people who have the most power to do it.  Instead, it 
obsesses over the “consent” of the victim—typically the one who 
has the least power in the situation—ignoring the inequalities 
that produce the forms of force that give the people who rape the 
drop on the person they assault.26  An inequality definition of the 
crime of rape would not focus enforcement efforts most on the 
people who have the least access to the forms of force that 
inequalities provide.  With all respect to Stephen Schulhofer’s 
lifetime dedication to creating a world in which only sex that 
women want happens, requiring that a rape defendant be aware 
that a sex partner is not consenting denies the well-documented 
effects of pornography consumption.  Consuming pornography 
eroticizes power in the consumer.  It makes the consumer believe 
not only sincerely, but the more pornography there is, the more 
the belief will look reasonable, that whatever someone is or is not 
saying or doing, they want to have sex.  Max Waltman reports this 
research accurately and up to date; 27 Shannon Gilreath powerfully 
analyzes some of its consequences. 28  Unfortunately, it is not the 
case, as Professor Schulhofer mentions, that consent has been 
eliminated from Michigan’s rape law, or that the redefinition of 
coercion operates for adult trafficking victims.29  Given his lucid 
 
 26. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
431 (2016). 
 27. Waltman, supra note 8, at 365–73; see also Max Waltman, The Politics of 
Legal Challenges to Pornography: Canada, Sweden, and the United States (2014) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stockholm University) (on file with Stockholm 
University). 
 28. Gilreath, supra note 16, at 297–99. 
 29. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335 
(2017). As Professor Schulhofer says, in 1975, Michigan removed the element of 
lack of consent and refocused on “force or coercion,” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a 
(2014), nor does “against her will” appear after that as an element of the crime.  
See People v. Nelson, 261 N.W.2d 299, 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).  Originally courts 
divided on whether consent as a defense existed.  Compare Nelson, 261 N.W.2d at 
307 (holding that consent is not a defense), with People v. Khan, 264 N.W.2d 360, 
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comprehension of my work on rape, and his accurate application of 
it to many issues in the law of rape, his omission of my principal 
critique—the inequality of its “many faces of force”30—is puzzling.  
What happened to that word? 
In the dialogue at this symposium, one audience question 
invited consideration of women’s involvement in peace by asking 
about the relation between Toward and my international work.  
Peace is not just men not fighting other men, although that 
appears to be its ruling international definition.  At least, the 
definition of absence of peace has expanded internationally to 
encompass before men started fighting each other and after men 
stopped fighting each other—termed pre-conflict and post-conflict.  
Although international law has made more progress in this 
respect than has been made elsewhere, there is no square 
understanding that violence against women is a conflict in the 
sense the United Nations was created to stop.  The conflict is 
gender-based and typically combines many inequalities in its 
execution.  Violence against women is very unpeaceful and very 
insecure, yet is at best recognized as a threat to international 
peace and security, not as a violation of it.  So violence against 
women persists every day in what is called peacetime. 
Now that inequality as hierarchy is more exposed than ever, 
in which the good ol’ boys bond to keep women second class, 
substantive equality is needed more than ever.  A formally-framed 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) having been proposed before, an 
 
366 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that consent is a defense).  Later decisions 
held that the defense of consent exists in some circumstances, e.g., “to negate the 
elements of force or coercion,” People v. Waltonen, 728 N.W. 2d 881, 887 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2006), or if it is a defense to another underlying felony, People v. Wilkens, 705 
N.W.2d 728, 735–36 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).  The fact that no defense of consent lies 
in Michigan for those who cannot legally give consent, such as children, People v. 
Starks, 701 N.W.2d 136, 141 (Mich. 2005), the case for some time, see People v. 
Cash, 351 N.W.2d 822, 829 (Mich. 1984), suggests its presence otherwise. Consent 
has not truly been removed.  Nor has force been redefined in inequality terms 
there, in Pennsylvania, or anywhere else in domestic law. 
  Confirming Professor Schulhofer’s suspicion, I was deeply involved with 
others in creating 18 U.S.C § 1591 et seq. (2000).  However (unsuccessfully opposed 
by many of us) no punishment is provided for coercion as so defined unless its 
victim is under age eighteen.  In other words, the legislative override in practical 
terms applied only to children, its fix of United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 
(1988) at best partial.  That the United States has ratified the Palermo Protocol, 
with its recognition that “abuse of power or a position of vulnerability,” is a 
circumstance like force, fraud, or coercion that produces sexual exploitation in the 
sex trafficking context, has not been domestically implemented in this connection.  
See G.A. Res. A/55/383, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov. 2, 2000) 
 30. Schulhofer, supra note 29, at 340. 
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extended substantive ERA is now being formulated.31  Having 
theorized feminism, we are now theorizing reality and practicing 
changing it.  Having failed to shatter a ceiling few women get 
anywhere near, before many of us go back to sleep, these Articles 
forward the insistence in Toward that we raise the floor. 
 
 31. Follow The ERA Coalition at ERA COALITION, www.eracoalition.org (last 
visited May 9, 2017). 
